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Measuring Risk Attitude and Relation to Marketing Behavior 
 
Abstract 
Researchers employ various measures of risk attitudes to investigate their relation to market 
behavior with mixed results. We find that a higher-order global risk attitude construct, developed 
using survey scales and experiments based on expected utility theory, is related to several 
marketing alternatives, but does not exhibit substantially greater explanatory power than 
underlying measures. With few exceptions, scales yield greater significance of risk attitudes for 
these choices, but experimental measures reveal other insights, e.g., differential attitudes in gain 
and loss domains. Given recent concerns with experimental measures in the literature, we 
suggest studies include scales as a low cost supplemental measure. 
 
Keywords: risk behavior, risk attitude, futures and options, forward contracts, marketing 
contracts. 
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Measuring Risk Attitude and Relation to Marketing Behavior 
 
Various measures of risk attitudes are employed in studies dealing with risk preferences 
and market behavior. The evidence on whether risk preferences influence behavior is 
mixed, which may reflect measurement issues as well as the decision contexts in which 
they have been measured. Main approaches consist of measures derived from 
experiments conducted under the expected utility framework and measures derived from 
multi-item scales (Antle 1987; Chavas and Holt 1990; Goodwin and Schroeder 1994; 
Smidts 1997; Pennings and Smidts 2000). Despite the popularity of experimental risk-
preference elicitation in the early 1980s (e.g., Binswanger 1981), there have been few 
applications in the agricultural economics literature since (the dialogue surrounding) 
Grisley and Kellog (1983, 1985). As an exception, Pennings and Garcia (2001) utilize 
common variance among measures from both approaches to develop a higher-order or 
global risk attitude construct (GRAC) and demonstrate, using factor analytic methods 
(Bollen 1989; Hair, et al. 1995; Thompson 2004), a statistically significant relation with 
producers’ intent to use futures markets. Still, few agricultural economists have used 
experiments to elicit risk-preferences since Pennings and Garcia (2001), as “simple 
questions and Likert scale questions are often preferred by applied researchers because of 
their ease of inclusion in mail surveys and/or their relative low cost ...” (Hudson, Lusk 
and Coble 2005, p.41).1 Further, several limitations of the expected utility framework 
have recently been identified (e.g., Just and Peterson 2010; Just, Khantachavana, and Just 
2010; Just 2011). 
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 Here, following Pennings and Garcia (2001), we develop a GRAC from measures 
derived from certainty equivalents obtained through computerized lottery experiments 
(i.e., expected utility theory) and from multi-item scales obtained through personal 
administration of a survey. We demonstrate the validity of this measure and its ability to 
predict market behavior for a sample of hog producers and crop producers, who keep 
accounting records through the Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) program at 
the University of Illinois. In contrast to prior studies that investigate the influence of risk 
attitudes on the use of an individual marketing tool, we examine relations between risk 
attitudes and the adoption and proportional use of several distinct marketing alternatives 
(i.e., spot markets, futures and options, forward contracts, and marketing contracts). 
 In this study, producers’ risk preferences are elicited directly (Roe 1982) and are 
represented by three measures that comprise a higher-order construct. Two measures are 
derived from responses to multi-item scales, and one is derived from the expected utility 
framework using the certainty equivalence technique for assessing the utility function. 
Negative exponential functions (EXP) and inverse power transformation (IPT) functions, 
respectively, are fit to certainty equivalents to determine if the curvature of the utility 
functions are globally concave (risk averse) or convex (risk seeking) as in the Pratt 
(1964) and Arrow (1971) framework or if the utility function exhibits an inflection point 
consistent with Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
Several studies evaluate the consistency of various measures of risk attitudes 
and/or their ability to predict behavior with mixed results (Pennings and Smidts 2000; 
Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde,Schupp, and Wagner 2005; Fausti and Gillespie 2006; 
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Fellner and Maciejovsky 2007; Anderson and Mellor 2009). Here, we evaluate the 
validity of a combined measure and its usefulness in predicting actual risk behavior, 
while controlling for other factors with accounting data. That is, various risk attitude 
measures are tested for convergent validity (i.e., positive correlation) using factor analytic 
methods (Bollen 1989; Hair, et al. 1995; Thompson 2004) to assess whether they reflect 
the same construct and for nomological validity (i.e., meaningful relation to other 
constructs, like measures of behavior) using hurdle model regression analysis (Cragg 
1971; Katchova and Miranda 2004).2 Hurdle models are utilized, since decisions 
regarding adoption of a particular marketing method and how much to sell using that 
method may be made separately or sequentially and may be influenced differently by the 
same variables (Katchova and Miranda 2004). Like Pennings and Garcia (2001), we find 
that different risk attitude measures used by researchers can be accounted for by a 
GRAC. We extend Pennings and Garcia’s (2001) framework by relating GRAC to 
several marketing alternatives (i.e., adoption and proportional use of marketing contracts, 
forward contracts, futures and options and spot market sales) and accounting for factors, 
other than risk preferences, that have been identified as (partly) driving marketing 
decisions (i.e., experience or age and education of the producer, size of the operation, and 
degree of leverage). By doing so, we obtain a more complete conceptual and empirical 
framework than Pennings and Garcia (2001), allowing us to better understand the role of 
GRAC and its components in producers’ decision making processes.  
 We proceed by reviewing various measures of risk attitude used by researchers 
and describing the elicitation process used in our research context. We then report the 
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empirical risk attitude measurements and classifications for the producers in the sample 
and relate their risk attitudes to actual market behavior. We conclude with a brief 
discussion of our findings and suggestions for future research. 
 
Literature Review 
The literature is mixed regarding the relative explanatory power of risk attitude measures 
derived from experiments and survey scales. Pennings and Smidts (2000) find that Likert 
scale survey items show some agreement with intentions to reduce risk, while lottery 
based measures are better predictors of actual market behavior. Dohmen, et al. (2005) 
find a general 11-point Likert scale explains a broad spectrum of risk behavior contexts, 
whereas a lottery measure does not. In their study, the best predictor of risk behavior in 
any particular context is a context-specific survey item.  Based on comparisons of the 
consistency of numerous survey measures of risk attitude, Fausti and Gillespie (2006) 
recommend using relatively simple elicitation procedures framed according to the 
situational construct in question. Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) find that only lotteries 
explain market behavior. Anderson and Mellor (2009) observe limited consistency across 
measures of risk attitudes derived from experiments with monetary rewards and survey 
questions with hypothetical gambles. Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) find 
that both nonparametric and parametric approaches to eliciting utility functions and 
quantifying loss aversion (and gain seeking) yield similar support for prospect theory. 
Pennings and Garcia (2001) demonstrate that a global risk attitude construct (GRAC) 
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utilizing common variance among scale and lottery based measures is statistically related 
to agricultural producers’ intent to use futures markets.  
 However, recent studies call into question the applicability of theories commonly 
underlying experimental elicitation of risk preferences. For instance, Just and Peterson 
(2010) and Just (2011) employ a method to assess the empirical adequacy of expected 
utility theory (EUT) by calibrating a utility function to revealed behavior. In empirical 
applications, both studies find limited applicability of EUT. Just and Peterson (2010, p. 
16) identify, “EUT is ... applicable only when expected payoffs of gambles are similar or 
when more than half of wealth is at risk.” Similarly, Just (2011) concludes that large 
wealth transfers are necessary to justify large changes in risk aversion under EUT and 
that prospect theory also seems an inappropriate representation of risk preferences given 
his results. Just and Lybbert (2012, p. 1) investigate aversion to marginal changes in risk 
as opposed to standard measures of (average) risk aversion and suggest, “While a high 
degree of correspondence can be found between these experimental results and real world 
response to risk (see e.g., Pennings and Garcia 2001), framing risk as static gambles in 
isolation may be too restrictive a frame.” 
Overall, the literature suggests that measurement of risk preferences should be 
framed in a situation that reflects the decision making context. However, it is also clear 
that risk measurement is complex as alternative measures can provide different views of 
how individuals’ respond.  In this context, we examine the value of combining risk 
measures, each of which may not be entirely consistent, to explain behavior.  Following 
Pennings and Garcia (2001), we develop a combined GRAC measure using scale and 
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lottery based measures and relate it to actual behavior. Specifically, we investigate the 
relation between GRAC and agricultural producers’ adoption and proportional use of 
marketing contracts, forward contracts, and futures and options contracts in addition to 
spot market sales. Furthermore, we consider other factors such as age, education level 
and leverage in order to better understand the role of GRAC in real marketing decisions. 
   
Research Measures and Methods 
The Risk Context 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990) and Shapira (1997) have demonstrated that risk 
attitude is context or situation specific. We examine Illinois agricultural producers’ 
attitudes toward price risk for hogs and corn. Price risk is substantial in production 
agriculture, and producers have numerous marketing tools available to help them manage 
this risk.  Hence, we elicit risk attitudes in the context of commodity price fluctuations 
and relate these measures to producers’ actual use of cash transactions, forward contracts, 
futures and options contracts, and marketing contracts.3 
A unique dataset was assembled by interviewing a sample of 50 hog producers 
and 49 corn producers in 2006. Annual accounting and production records are kept for 
these producers through the Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) program at the 
University of Illinois, eliminating the need for producers to consult records to provide 
accurate estimates of such data during interviews (Pennings, Irwin, and Good 2002). 
FBFM is a cooperative educational-service available to all agricultural producers in 
Illinois for a fee (Lattz, Cagley, and Raab 2005). Presently, about one out of five Illinois 
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commercial farms with over 500 acres or over $100,000 total farm sales participate. 
Interviewed FBFM producers are generally representative of larger commercial 
producers (Table 1). The program assists producers with management decisions by 
providing business analysis through computerized processing of records for income tax 
management. Secondary production and accounting data are collected annually by 58 full 
time field staff specialists serving nine FBFM associations or regions. The resulting 
dataset provides extensive information on the cost and debt structure of the farm 
operations, as well as the source of revenues (i.e., grain or livestock production). 
Four rounds of pretests – two with FBFM personnel on campus and two with ten 
producers at their residences – were performed in October 2006. Using a personal 
interview process in pretests is more likely to yield improvements to the questionnaire 
than impersonal administration (Reynolds and Diamantopoulos 1998). In each case, 
survey items were modified, eliminated, and added based on comments regarding any 
ambiguity or other difficulty experienced with responding to the questionnaire. When 
possible, items that require ratings or checking boxes were employed in place of open-
ended questions, based on reports from the survey literature that respondents prefer the 
former over the latter (Pennings, Irwin, and Good 2002). Consequently, pretest 
participants sometimes noted omission of potentially relevant response alternatives, one 
of the most common errors detected via survey pretesting (Hunt, Sparkman, and Wilcox 
1982).   
One hundred fifty producers were contacted and as encouragement for their 
participation in interviews were offered a chance at one of ten $100 lottery prizes. 
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Balakrishnan et al. (1992) found that using a lottery prize giveaway significantly 
increases willingness to respond to surveys.  Personal interviews, averaging just over an 
hour, limited the sample size but enhanced the reliability of survey responses and enabled 
collection of risk attitude measures via computerized lottery experiments. Interviews 
were conducted from November 20, 2006 through April 2, 2007 at the producers’ farms 
or privately at Illinois Extension offices.  This lengthy interview period reflects the time 
intensive nature of driving to visit with individual producers and the greater availability 
of crop producers in January and February (Pennings, Irwin, and Good 2002). 
 
The Certainty Equivalence Technique 
Producers were asked to “put themselves in the situation of selling their commodity” 
when completing a computerized experiment where they faced two alternatives – one 
with a 50%/50% lottery (representing spot price risk) in which initial upper and lower 
bounds were set by researchers based on historical price ranges and one with a fixed price 
randomly generated by the computer within the initial price range. Prices for corn were in 
dollars per bushel and for hogs were in dollars per hundredweight. Hog producer 
experiments were available on either a live hog or lean hog (carcass) price basis, 
whichever producers were more familiar with. Based on producers’ choices, the 
computer updates the fixed price and lottery price options, and does so for five iterations 
for each of seven utility points and three consistency checks, entailing a total of 50 
decisions (five iterations per utility point for 10 total utility points). On average, the 
experiment took 11 minutes to complete or about 13 seconds per decision.   
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Following Pennings and Smidts (2003), the resulting certainty equivalents are fit 
to negative exponential (EXP) and inverse power transformation (IPT) functions to 
determine the shape of producers’ utility functions u(x). The EXP function implies 
constant absolute risk attitude and increasing proportional risk attitude and is expressed 
as 
(1)     = 	 	


	
, 
where xL and xH are lower and upper bounds of the outcome range of the 50%/50% 
lottery, xi is the assessed certainty equivalent, and c is the risk attitude coefficient. A risk 
attitude coefficient c> 0 implies concavity (risk aversion), c< 0 implies convexity (risk 
seeking), and c = 0 implies linearity (risk neutral). The IPT function is given by 
(2)      = 	 	
[/	], 
where xi is again the certainty equivalent and α, β, and γ are coefficients characterizing 
the shape of u(x). Here, S-shaped utility functions (concave, i.e., risk-averse, in gains and 
convex, i.e., risk-seeking in losses) described in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
prospect theory may be observed, where the inflection point may be given by u(x)= 
1/2×(1- γ/β). Since certainty equivalents, and not utility points, are elicited with error by 
experiments, the inverses of EXP and IPT functions are estimated. The inverse of the 
EXP function is 
(3)     =	 	.!

"#
$
	% + ', 
where xl and xh, respectively, represent the low and high outcomes of the 50%/50% 
lottery, and ei is a residual error term. The inverse of the IPT function is given by 
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where εi is a residual error term. 
 
The Risk-Attitude Scales 
We follow the iterative procedure proposed by Churchill (1995) to obtain reliable and 
valid scales.4 First, a pool of survey items (i.e., potential indicators) was accumulated. 
Specifically, we start with items previously validated in agricultural marketing contexts 
(e.g., Pennings and Garcia 2001). The clarity and appropriateness of the items was 
evaluated through pretests with producers of hogs and corn. Producers completed the 
questionnaire and indicated any ambiguity or difficulty experienced in responding to 
items. Their feedback suggested the need to only modify a few items in the interest of 
clarity, which is not surprising given the use of these items in previous research. The 
survey items used to measure risk attitude are listed in Table 2. 
 
Measurement of Control Variables 
Prior research commonly controls for the effects of age or experience and education of 
the producer, size of the operation, and degree of leverage (i.e., debt) on marketing 
decisions. Studies find that age is negatively related the percentage of crops forward 
priced (Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 1996) and to contract production of hogs (Key and 
McBride 2003), and experience is negatively related to the proportion of crop sales made 
with futures and options contracts (Shapiro and Brorsen 1988; Sartwelle, O’Brien, 
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Tierney, and Eggers 2000). Hence, we expect producer’s AGE in years to be positively 
related to cash sales and negatively related to contract use.   
College education is expected to lead to greater use of forward pricing with tools 
such as futures and options contracts, but the evidence is mixed (Shapiro and Brorsen 
1988; Goodwin and Schroeder 1994; Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 1996), and education 
appears to be negatively related to contract production of hogs (Key and McBride 2003).  
Thus, we anticipate COLLEGE, which equals one if the producer has a college education 
and zero otherwise, is positively related to forward pricing tools (i.e., forward contracts 
and futures and options) and negatively related to production contracting.  Forward 
pricing is also significantly associated with larger acreage crop farms (Shapiro and 
Brorsen 1988; Goodwin and Schroeder 1994; Sartwelle, O’Brien, Tierney, and Eggers 
2000), and contract hog production is generally greater among operations raising larger 
numbers of hogs. Hence, we expect positive relationships between use of these contracts 
and size as approximated by SALES (in $1000).  
Typically, contract use is expected to be greater among producers bearing more 
debt, as lenders may extend additional loans to operations with stable cash flows. While 
the DEBT/ASSET ratio is expected to reflect this effect, we note that existing evidence 
using this measure is quite mixed (Shapiro and Brorsen 1988; Goodwin and Schroeder 
1994; Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 1996; Key and McBride 2003; Katchova and 
Miranda 2004; Davis and Gillespie 2007). Finally, we include HOGS, which equals one 
for hog producers and zero otherwise (i.e., crop producers), to control for industry effects 
with no a priori expectations as to the direction of these effects. 
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Modeling Marketing Behavior 
Several studies investigating determinants of the proportion of a crop contracted have 
employed Tobit procedures (e.g., Shapiro and Brorsen 1988; Goodwin and Schroeder 
1994; Musser, Patrick and Eckman 1996). The log-likelihood for the Tobit model 
contains probabilities of nonuse of contracts from a Probit regression in the first term and 
a classical regression for positive amounts contracted in the second term: 
(5) ∑∑
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where Ф(•) is the standard normal probability density function, xi and βα are vectors of 
independent variables and coefficients, σ is the standard deviation, and αi denotes the 
proportion contracted.5  Following Katchova and Miranda (2004), αi is not constrained 
from above since a producer conceivably may contract more than his actual ex post 
production. Under the Tobit formulation, the independent variables and associated 
coefficients are constrained to be the same for the contract adoption and proportion 
contracted decisions. Cragg’s (1971) less restrictive hurdle or two-step model does not 
require the variables and coefficients for both decisions to be the same.  The log-
likelihood is the sum of the log-likelihood of a Probit regression (the first two terms) and 
the log-likelihood of a truncated regression (the second two terms) and is given by 
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where zi and γ are vectors of independent variables and coefficients pertaining to contract 
adoption and, and as before, xi and βi are vectors of independent variables and 
coefficients pertaining to the proportion contracted.  When zi = xi and γ = βα/σ, equations 
(5) and (6) are equivalent. 
 
Results of Risk-Attitude Measurements 
Expected Utility Framework 
Ten certainty equivalents were assessed for seven utility levels between u(x) = 0 and u(x) 
= 1 with two certainty equivalents measured at u(x) = 0.25, u(x) = 0.50, and u(x) = 0.75 as 
checks of internal consistency.6 If producers respond in accordance with expected utility 
theory, certainty equivalents for a given utility level should differ only by random 
response error. Pairwise t-tests indicate no statistically significant difference between 
assessed certainty equivalents for each of the consistency checks (p> 0.23). This result 
implies that producers’ decisions are consistent and substantiates the experiment design’s 
resemblance to the real business context, thereby limiting response mode effects 
(Payne1997; Shapira 1997). 
 Certainty equivalents are fit to inverses of EXP and IPT functions to determine 
the global shape of producers’ utility functions. A producer is assigned to the EXP group 
if EXP estimation fits the data as well as or better than IPT estimation.  However, if the 
mean squared error from IPT estimation is significantly lower than that from EXP 
estimation, based on pairwise t-tests, then the producer is assigned to the IPT group. 
Thus, on average, IPT estimation yields statistically higher R-squares and lower root 
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mean squared errors for the IPT group, but there is not a statistical difference between the 
two estimation techniques for the EXP group (Table 3). That is, if EXP fit the data 
equally or better than IPT, then the producer is classified as EXP. For the EXP group, the 
risk attitude coefficient c indicates that the median producer is risk-neutral and the mean 
producer is risk-seeking. For the IPT group, producers, on average, have an S-shaped 
(convex, concave) function (i.e., β>γ). Table 4 summarizes the classifications of utility 
function shape for the whole sample and by hog and corn producers. Across samples, a 
smaller proportion of the producers are risk-averse than risk-neutral and risk-seeking, and 
nearly a quarter possess S-shaped utilities. 
Estimates of the IPT function also allow derivation of inflection points for IPT 
group utility functions, which closely correspond to 2006 production costs. The slope 
coefficient from an OLS regression of inflection points on average costs of production is 
not statistically different from one (Table 5). Simpler pairwise t-tests of mean differences 
corroborate this finding for the full sample but also reveal how closely infection points 
correspond to average production costs for hog and corn producer subgroups (Table 6). 
For hog producers the difference is not statistically significant, but for grain producers the 
average inflection overestimates average production costs. This is consistent with hog 
producers thinking about both costs and revenues (i.e., prices) on a per hog basis. Crop 
producers, due to yield variation, typically think of average production costs per acre 
instead of dollars per bushel as crop prices are quoted. Since yield variation makes it 
difficult to accurately convert production costs from a per acre to a per bushel basis, crop 
producers tend to overestimate production costs to arrive at a conservative break-even 
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price as a reference point when thinking in terms of gains and losses in lottery 
experiments. 
 
Scaling Framework 
Exploratory factor analysis of items in Table 2 for the hogs and corn group (hogs and 
soybeans group) yielded eigenvalues for the first two factors of 2.87 and 1.11 (2.85 and 
1.11), supporting a two factor model of risk aversion where the first and second factors, 
respectively, explained 47.90% and 18.50% (47.57% and 18.43%) of the variation in the 
data. The first two items in Table 2 comprise Scale 1 and the last four comprise Scale 2.  
All of the factor loadings of the items exceeded 0.50, and Cronbach’s (1951) alphas 
between 0.70 and 0.90 indicate high reliability for the construct measurement (Streiner 
and Norman 1995). 
 Based on average sum scores for these risk attitude factors or scales, producers 
are classified as risk-averse (positive scores), risk-neutral (zero scores), or risk-seeking 
(negative scores) in Table 7. Note that some of the scale’s items required recoding so that 
negative scores imply risk-seeking and positive scores imply risk aversion. By these 
measures, the proportion of risk-averse producers is notably higher than indicated by 
measures rooted in the expected utility approach (i.e., comparing classifications in Tables 
4 and 7). It may be that Table 4 statistics underestimate the percentage of risk-averse 
producers, as producers with S-shaped utility functions may exhibit risk-aversion for 
prices ranging in the domain of gains, and IPT estimates do not provide a risk attitude 
coefficient as is provided by EXP estimates.7 It is worth noting that average sum scores 
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of risk attitude scales 1 and 2 indicate greater proportions of risk averse producers in the 
IPT (S-shaped) utility function group (84% and 56%, respectively) than among those in 
the EXP group (69% and 51%, respectively), and also that a large percentage of IPT 
group producers use contracts that may limit their exposure to price risk (Tables 7 and 8). 
 
Global Risk Attitude Construct 
Figure 1 shows the results of confirmatory factor analysis to investigate the presence of a 
higher order measure of risk attitude or a global risk attitude construct (GRAC), which is 
comprised of risk aversion coefficients computed from the certainty equivalent measure 
given by equation (1) and the two scale measures.8 The analysis was conducted on the 
subsample of 74 producers for which certainty equivalents fit the EXP function better 
than the IPT function, as risk attitude coefficient may be ascertained from EXP estimates 
but not IPT estimates (see footnote 7).  The analysis differs from exploratory factor 
analysis in that items 3 through 6, for instance, are permitted to influence only Scale 2. 
This second-order model quantifies the presence of a common, higher order, latent factor 
based on correlations across the three latent risk attitude measures. Each of the three 
latent risk attitude measures is significantly related to the GRAC at the 10 percent level 
or better. The model exhibits good adherence to the data with χ2/df of 1.22 (p = 0.262), 
root mean squared error (RMSE) of 0.047, and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) of 0.962 
supporting the presence of a GRAC.9 Asterisks in Figure 1 reflect the significance of 
GRAC components. Interestingly, in contrast to Pennings and Garcia (2001), where the 
GRAC was driven by measures derived from experiments, here scales have a relatively 
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greater influence on GRAC composition. This point is reflective of the relative ability of 
individual components of the GRAC to explain behavior, as discussed in the next section. 
 
Global Risk Attitude Construct and Marketing Behavior 
Marginal effects from regressions for adoption (i.e., binary probit) and proportional use 
(i.e., truncated least squares) of various marketing alternatives are presented in Table 9 
for hog and corn sales.10 In particular, we examine producers’ usage of marketing 
contracts, forward contracts, futures and options, and spot sales.   
Findings for several producer characteristics are consistent with prior findings. 
For instance, age is positively related to spot market use and negatively related to 
contract use (Table 9). Producers with larger operations, as indicated by level of sales (in 
$100,000) and those with college education are more likely to use futures and options. Of 
the producers using futures and options, those with college education use these marketing 
tools proportionally less. Such interesting subtleties are observable due to the hurdle 
model approach used here (Cragg 1971; Katchova and Miranda 2004) and may be 
masked in prior studies using Tobit regressions. Producers with higher DEBT/ASSET 
ratios use spot markets less and forward contracts more. Relative to crop producers, there 
is lower use of forward contracts and futures and options by hog producers, but greater 
use of marketing contracts. 
Notably, risk aversion (GRAC) decreases proportional use of spot markets and 
increases proportional use of forward contracts but not futures and options. Clearly, 
finding that producers with relatively greater aversion to risk make greater use of forward 
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contracts to limit their exposure to cash price variation is an intuitive result. The finding 
for futures and options is unexpected, however. It may be that futures and options are 
also used for reasons other than risk abatement. During interviews, some producers noted 
that they at times utilize futures markets in a more speculative manner, and the fact that 
futures and options usage was not distinguished by motives (i.e., hedging vs. speculation) 
in data collection may contribute to confounding effects. Another unexpected result is 
that risk aversion significantly decreases proportional use of marketing contracts for hog 
and corn sales (Table 9). However, this finding is particularly sensitive to model 
specification. Replacing the debt-to-asset ratio by an alternative measure (i.e., capital 
replacement and term debt repayment margin) or using soybean sales in place of corn 
sales yields alternative results. Under these specifications, adoption of marketing 
contracts significantly increases with risk aversion (respective p-values of 0.104 and 
0.016) but indicates no significant effects on proportional usage. Similarly, adoption of 
marketing contracts is significantly greater among producers with S-shaped utility 
functions, as measured by a binary dummy variable (p-value = 0.082) in probit 
regressions using the alternative debt measure but not the debt-to-asset ratio.11 This 
finding may reflect loss-averse producers’ willingness to sign contracts offering price 
floors or premiums over cash prices that help to ensure profitability. 
Table 10 compares R2 values from alternative regressions using each of the 
measures of risk attitude to assess their relative explanatory contribution. The GRAC is 
the best predictor in only two of these regressions, but is a close second in many of the 
others.  In light of the relative importance of the scale measures in the GRAC 
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formulation, it is not be too surprising that these measures provide somewhat similar or 
even modestly better explanatory power than the more sophisticated construct.  
Examination of the importance of the individual risk coefficients (not shown) also is 
supportive of the scale measures. For the regressions, the measures derived from scales 
typically are at least as significant as the GRAC and more significant than the measure 
derived from experiments alone.  Only for the binary probit models related to forward 
contract adoption did the experimentally derived measure provide a significant and a 
more intuitively positive relationship than the scale measures. This relationship also is 
not implied by the heavily scale influenced GRAC measure. 
These findings contrast Pennings and Garcia’s (2001) results in which the GRAC 
is more heavily influenced by two experimental measures than by scales, and is superior 
to the underlying components as a predictor of producers’ intended behavior.  In addition, 
Pennings and Garcia’s (2001) GRAC has a significantly positive influence on producers’ 
intended futures market usage, while we find no such relationship between actual futures 
market usage and any of the risk attitude measures. Notably, Pennings and Garcia’s 
(2001) structural equation model accounts for measurement and modeling error but does 
not distinguish between adoption and proportional use of marketing methods and does 
not control for other producer characteristics as we do here.  
 
Conclusions  
This paper builds on previous research by Pennings and Garcia (2001) that relates 
producers’ intention to use futures contracts to a global risk attitude construct (GRAC) 
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comprised of multi-item scale and expected utility theory (EUT) based measures of risk 
attitude.  Here, the relation between a GRAC and several distinct alternative marketing 
methods is investigated for hog producers and corn producers for which production and 
accounting data are available through the Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) 
program at the University of Illinois.  
The reliability and validity of the risk attitude measures underlying the GRAC is 
established first. As indicated by EUT measures derived from experiments, most of the 
interviewed producers possess globally concave (risk-averse) or convex (risk-seeking) 
utility functions, from which risk aversion coefficients could easily be inferred for 
development of the GRAC. Interestingly, average costs of production seem to drive the 
occurrence of inflection points for a quarter of the sample, which exhibit S-shaped utility 
functions corresponding to Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This group 
of producers may be risk averse for prices ranging above their production cost (i.e., 
gains) and risk seeking for lower price ranges (i.e., losses). For hog producers, production 
costs do not differ significantly from inflection points, but corn producers’ inflection 
points are statistically higher than average costs of production. Corn producers normally 
view production costs on a per acre basis due to yield variation and appear to error on the 
side of caution when converting production costs to a per bushel basis for comparison to 
per bushel prices. 
Regression analyses reveal that increasing risk aversion is statistically associated 
with lower use of spot transactions and greater use of forward contracts.  Here, using the 
GRAC measure of risk attitude offers similar or better explanatory power than its 
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underlying measures. However in other cases, the scale measures provide modestly better 
explanatory power and significant findings—a result consistent with their relative 
importance in the GRAC formulation.  Despite the conceptual attractiveness of 
combining various risk measures, the overall findings suggest that their use may yield 
little relative gain in explaining behavior.   
In the context of the literature our findings are mixed. Our results highlight the 
importance of the Likert scales, but do not signal the superiority over lottery measures 
found by Dohmen, et al (2005). They also contrast with Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) 
who find that only lotteries explain market behavior, and with Anderson and Mellor 
(2009) who observe little consistency across survey and experimental measures of risk 
attitudes. Our findings are somewhat similar to Pennings and Garcia (2001) who 
demonstrate that a GRAC utilizing common variance among scale and lottery based 
measures is statistically related to producers’ intended use of futures markets. However, 
the superiority of their GRAC measure relative to its underlying components, and the 
relatively greater contribution of the EUT measure to its formulation, is not observed in 
our results. One possible explanation for these differences is our focus on actual 
marketing behavior, rather than intentions. Our finding of relatively lower significance 
and explanatory power of the EUT measure in comparison to alternative measures seems 
consistent with recent work raising questions about the adequacy of risk attitude 
measures derived from experiments based on EUT (e.g., Just and Peterson 2010; Just, 
Khantachavana, and Just 2010; Just 2011). Clearly, these concerns imply that further 
work is needed to improve risk attitude measures derived from experiments. Our findings 
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also suggests that including survey items on risk attitudes may be a low cost supplement 
to experiments as they allow for checks of consistency and accuracy of EUT measures 
and permit comparative analysis of risk-related behavior.  
Further, future research may investigate under which circumstances simpler rather 
than more sophisticated risk measures are needed. One advantage of lottery-based 
experiments is that they yield measures that allow insights into whether risk attitudes 
differ in the domains of gains and losses, as suggested by prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). Typical use of simpler scale survey items does not permit identification 
of such effects.  However, a challenge with S-shaped utility functions is that it becomes 
more problematic to identify effects of risk attitudes on behavior, unless data are 
collected for several utility points in both gain and loss domains. Pennings and Smidts 
(2003) find that S-shaped utility functions are related to operational or organizational 
decisions to buy rather than make (raise) weaner pigs, whereas we find some evidence 
that producers with S-shaped utility functions are more likely to use marketing contracts.  
Future research can investigate whether asking producers to answer scale survey items 
under alternative scenarios of higher and lower price ranges yield similar insights. 
Finally, the results presented here indicate that much of the unexplained variance in 
marketing behavior reflects factors other than error in measuring risk attitude. This 
suggests the importance of proper specification of the surrounding situation to accurately 
identify the effect of risk on behavior.  
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Footnotes
                                                 
1 Papers citing Pennings and Garcia (2001) typically acknowledge the comprehensive 
approach combining scale and experimental measures of risk attitude and proceed to use 
one or the other measure individually in their own work (e.g., Lusk and Coble 2005; 
Hudson, Lusk and Coble 2005; Franken, Pennings, and Garcia 2012) or reference the use 
of factor analysis to combine measures (e.g., Tonsor, Schroeder, and Pennings 2009; 
Pope, Schroeder, Langemeier,and Herbel 2011). 
2Convergent validity (i.e., positive correlation) refers to whether variables reflect the 
same construct and for nomological validity reflects meaningful relation to other 
constructs, e.g., measures of behavior (Churchill 1995). 
3 While specialty crop (e.g., seed, non-genetically modified, or identity preservation) 
contracts could be distinguished as production contracts, since producers may not take 
ownership of the seed or crop in some cases, they are categorized here as specialty 
marketing contracts following Katchova and Miranda (2003). 
4 Reliability pertains to whether variables are consistent with the concept they are 
intended to measure, and validity pertains to the extent that a set of measures correctly 
represent the concept. 
5 The proportion contracted iα equals the latent variable
*
iα  for iii X αα εβα +′=* > 0 and 
equals zero otherwise, where iαε  are independently and normally distributed residuals 
with mean zero and variance σ2. 
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6 Except for the first lottery, in which outcomes were set based on historical prices, 
outcomes depend on producers’ prior choices between lotteries and certain prices. Thus, 
outcome ranges and expected values of lotteries vary across producers. 
7 Since elicited certainty equivalents span both domains of losses and gains, there exist 
insufficient numbers of certainty equivalents to detect statistically positive risk attitude 
coefficients (i.e., risk aversion) for just the gains domain. 
8 Estimated relationships can be expressed as y = Λyη + ε between observed variables y 
and first-order factors η and η = Γξ + ζ between first-order factors and second-order 
factors ξ, where Λy and Γ are matrices of partial regression coefficients commonly 
referred to as factor loadings and ε and ζ are residual errors. See Pennings and Garcia 
(2001) for a more detailed account of the measurement model for the second order factor.  
9 For RMSE, a value below 0.08 indicates a close fit (Browne and Cudeck 1986). For 
TLI, a value greater than 0.90 is recommended (Hair et al. 1995). 
10 To examine the sensitivity of our results, the analysis was conducted using the capital 
replacement and term debt repayment margin in place of the debt-to-asset ratio or using 
soybean sales in place of corn sales. Except as otherwise noted herein, the results are 
largely similar to those presented here. 
11 Such findings of sensitivity to specification can emerge when the correlation between 
different measures of the financial situation and risk attitudes are non-zero. 
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Table 1. Comparison of Size Distribution for Sample and Industry 
Distribution of Hog Producers by Size Distribution of Crop Producers by Size 
FBFM 
Surveyed 
Producers IL US 
FBFM 
Surveyed 
Producers 
U.S. 
Harvested 
Cropland 
>5,000 head 33.33% 17.70% 10.68% > 2,000 acres 8.33% 4.98% 
2,000-4,999 head 37.50% 12.47% 6.78% 1,000 to 1,999 acres 35.42% 5.94% 
1,000-1,999 head 12.50% 10.81% 4.66% 500 to 999 acres 35.42% 9.12% 
500-999 head 6.25% 8.33% 4.49% < 499 acres 20.83% 79.96% 
200-499 head 10.42% 9.76% 5.69% 
< 200 head 0.00% 40.94% 67.70% 
 
a2007 Census of Agriculture, available at 
http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Full_Report/usv1.pdf 
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Table 2. Scale Items Representing Farmers’ Risk Attitude and Results of Factor Analysis 
  Hog and Corn Data 
Risk Attitude Item: Factor 1 Factor 2 
1. I usually like “playing it safe” (for instance, “locking in a price”) instead of taking risks for 
market prices for my commodity. 
0.916 0.209 
2. When selling/marketing my commodity, I prefer financial certainty to financial uncertainty. 0.745 0.202 
3. When selling/marketing my commodity, I am willing to take higher financial risks in order 
to realize higher average returns. 
0.032 0.573 
4. I like taking financial risks with my commodity farm business. 0.450 0.609 
5. I accept more risk in my commodity farm than other commodity farmers. 0.188 0.562 
6. With respect to the conduct of business, I dislike risk. 0.304 0.512 
Reliability:     
Cronbach's Alpha 0.839 0.700 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items 0.841 0.700 
 
Note: Scaling was from -4 for strongly risk seeking to 4 for strongly risk averse. For hog farmers hogs was used in place of 
commodity. For grain farmers grain was used in place of commodity. 
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Table 3. Comparing Average Fit of EXP and IPT Functions for EXP and IPT Groups 
EXP (N = 74) IPT (N= 25) 
Adj R2 RMSE c Adj R2 RMSE gamma beta Alpha 
Median 0.9990 0.2485 0.0000 0.9992 0.1212 13.6667 126.0721 -72.9669 
Mean  
  EXP 0.9981 0.8698 -0.1891 0.9931 1.963 63.6363 758.0779 -89.0266 
(0.0003) (0.1130) (0.0010) (0.3962) 
  IPT 0.9846 0.9791 0.999 0.6951 
(0.0135) (0.1505) (0.0002) (0.1559) 
Difference 0.0135 -0.1093 -0.0059*** 1.2680*** 
(0.0135) (0.1312) (0.0010) (0.3269) 
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Table 4. Shape of Utility Functions Elicited from Lottery Task 
All 
Producers 
Hogs 
Producers 
Corn 
Producers 
N 99 50 49 
Risk Averse 14% 12% 16% 
Risk Neutral 28% 28% 29% 
Risk Seeking 32% 34% 31% 
S-Shaped 25% 26% 24% 
100% 100% 100% 
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Table 5. Results from Regressions of Inflection Points on Average Production Costs 
Coefficient Adjusted R2 Joint H0:β1  = 1 and β0 = 0. 
Average Production Cost (β1) 0.9934*** 0.9605 F(2, 23) = 0.8400 
(0.0411)  Prob> F = 0.4425 
Constant (β0) 1.2127   
(1.2382)   
 
Note: N = 25.  Triple asterisk (***) denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 6. Pairwise T-Test of Mean Differences between Inflection Points and Average 
Production Costs 
Mean Mean 
Producer Type Inflection Point Average Production Cost  Difference 
  All Producers 23.5000 22.4344 1.0656 
(4.1535) (4.1009) (0.8090) 
Hog Producers 42.7669 41.5192 1.2477 
(1.3781) (1.1984) (1.5774) 
Grain Producers 2.6275 1.7592 0.8683*** 
(0.0818) (0.1190) (0.1665) 
 
Note: N = 13 for hog producers, 12 for grain producers, and 25 for all producers.  Triple 
asterisk (***) denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 7. Classification of Respondents Based on Average Sum Scores of Risk 
Attitude Scales 
All Producers Hog Producers Corn Producers 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Risk Averse 69% 51% 58% 52% 80% 49% 
Risk Neutral 11% 5% 12% 10% 10% 0% 
Risk Seeking 20% 44% 30% 38% 10% 51% 
 
Note: N = 99 
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Table 8. Contract Use and Risk Attitude Scales for Producers with S-Shaped Utility 
Functions 
Percentage of Producers with S-Shaped Utility Functions Using 
Futures & Options Forward Contracts Marketing Contracts 
35% 74% 39% 
Risk Preference: Factor 1 Factor 2 
Risk Averse 84% 56% 
Risk Neutral 4% 12% 
Risk Seeking 12% 32% 
 
Note: N = 25 
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Table 9. Marginal Effects for Hog and Corn Sales Regressions 
 Spot Sales Marketing Contract Futures & Options Forward Contract 
 Binary 
Probit 
Truncated 
OLS 
Binary 
Probit 
Truncated 
OLS 
Binary 
Probit 
Truncated 
OLS 
Binary 
Probit 
Truncated 
OLS 
AGE 0.0079** 0.0108*** -0.0124** 0.0172*** -0.0248*** -0.0143 -0.0053 -0.0008 
 (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0050) (0.0037) (0.0091) (0.0101) (0.0051) (0.0062) 
COLLEGE 0.0240 -0.0357 -0.0122 -0.4058*** 0.2675* -0.4622** 0.0496 0.1334 
(1=Yes, 0=No) (0.0724) (0.0652) (0.0700) (0.1007) (0.1449) (0.2140) (0.0898) (0.1051) 
SALES -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0004 -0.0065** 0.0105*** 0.0008 -0.0006 0.0041 
($100,000) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0017) (0.0043) 
HOG -0.0577 0.3989*** 0.1694* 0.6874*** -0.4475*** -0.4251 -0.5449*** -0.5932*** 
(1=Yes, 0=No) (0.0867) (0.0795) (0.0917) (0.1618) (0.1497) (0.2787) (0.1056) (0.2218) 
DEBT/ASSET -0.0007 -0.0047*** 0.0019 0.0008 0.0024 0.0055 0.0029 0.0051** 
 (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0031) (0.0047) (0.0023) (0.0025) 
GRAC -0.0081 -0.0147** 0.0087 -0.0344* 0.0157 -0.0211 0.0115 0.0188* 
 (0.0078) (0.0068) (0.0073) (0.0198) (0.0146) (0.0181) (0.0102) (0.0109) 
  Sigma – 0.2269*** – 0.1023*** – 0.2584*** – 0.2641*** 
  (0.0242)  (0.0209)  (0.0622)  (0.0428) 
Observations 71 62 71 12 71 29 71 51 
  Censored – 9  
truncated 
– 59 
truncated 
– 42 
truncated 
– 20 
truncated 
Log Likelihood -23.1162 11.2832 -21.7598 10.3281 -36.3233 15.5511 -25.4614 15.1886 
Pseudo R2 0.1436 0.3645 0.3254 0.0071 0.2435 0.1305 0.3968 0.3984 
 
Note: Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.   
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Table 10. R
2
 for Models of Marketing Methods for Hog Producers and Corn 
Producers using Alternative Measures of Risk Attitude 
Spot Marketing Contract Futures & Options Forward Contracts 
Probit Truncated Probit Truncated Probit Truncated Probit Truncated 
Scale 1 0.1299 0.3725 0.3343 0.0090 0.2522 0.0989 0.3924 0.3960 
Scale 2 0.1338 0.3134 0.3051 0.0251 0.2315 0.1619 0.3899 0.3652 
u(x) 0.1245 0.3148 0.3333 0.0475 0.2459 0.1862 0.4099 0.3554 
GRAC 0.1436 0.3645 0.3254 0.0071 0.2435 0.1305 0.3968 0.3984 
 
Note: Best R2 is bolded. 
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Figure 1. Second-order confirmatory factor model 
Note: Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.   
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